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24 March 2003: "Armchair military analysis 102"

Michael Voss of the BBC reports the suspected presence of three brigades of Republican Guard between Karbala and Baghdad, and British prime minister Tony Blair stated in the House of Commons that:

"It is a little way from there that they will encounter the Medina division of the Republican Guard who are defending the route to Baghdad."

I will take these statements as a cue to take a look at the Iraqi forces (following on from this previous entry, in which I neglected them).

Iraq has, on paper, a formidable array of military and paramilitary forces.

The regular army comprises five army corps; the following was thought current as of last year:
I Corps (HQ Kirkuk; one mechanised, three infantry divisions) has the demarcation line with the Kurdish autonomous zone as its primary Area Of Responsibility (AOR).
II Corps (HQ Al-Mansouriyah, in Diyala province; one armoured, two infantry divisions) has the northern sector of the Iranian border as its AOR.
III Corps (HQ Basra; one armoured, one mechanised and one infantry division) is responsible for the Kuwait/Saudi border.
IV Corps (HQ Amarah; one armoured and two infantry divisions) is responsible for the southern sector of the Iranian border.
V Corps (HQ Mosul; one mechanised and three infantry divisions) is responsible for the Syrian border.

As we see, each corps has three or four divisions, totalling seventeen (to compare, the US regular army has 10 divisions, though admittedly, each of these has up to twice the manpower of an Iraqi division).
Of these, three are armoured—the 3rd (II Corps), the 6th (III Corps) and the 10th (IV Corps)—three are mechanised—the 1st (V Corps), the 5th (I Corps) and the 51st (II Corps)—while the rest are light infantry (i.e. they are moved around by truck, and fight on foot). The six "heavy" divisions are designated according to the predominant manoeuvre element: the armoured divisions have two armoured brigades and one mechanised brigade, mechanised divisions vice-versa (in turn, an armoured brigade—e.g. the 1st Division's 34th ArmdBde—comprises three tank regiments and one mechanised infantry battalion, while a mechanised brigade—e.g.1st Division's 27th MechBde—comprises three mechanised infantry battalions and a single tank regiment). The heavies' primary main battle tank is the (damn near antique) Soviet T-55 and its PRC clone, the Type 59, though the corps on the border with Iran—Iraq's most dangerous neighbour—have some T-62s (though this is a mixed blessing; see the "Limitations" paragraph in the FAS piece). For the mechanised infantry, the most prolific vehicle is the MTLB armoured personnel carrier, though the occasional battalion fields the BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle.
It should be noted, however, that this inventory is a paper one; losses incurred during the 1991 war and twelve years of arms sanctions have degraded the state of Iraq's armoured capability to the extent that, to redeploy one heavy division, two others have to be stripped for spare parts.

III Corps' 51st MechDiv is/was the Iraqi army's heavy division with the highest-numbered designation, and therefore probably the lowest prestige; thus, it is highly likely that the 51st was the first outfit cannibalised for spare parts. As a result, its rapid collapse is not necessarily indicative of how every Iraqi heavy division will hold up. However, the Iraqi army's manoeuvering capability is severely limited, and to which extent it can play a part in the defence of Iraq, at least in the role one would normally expect from a regular army, is open to question.

This also goes to some extent for the al-Jaish as-Shabi, the "Popular Army"; this is a territorial defence, similar to, say, the former Yugoslav TO. It is a part-time militia, whose organisation mirrors that of the civil adminstrative districts of Iraq (provincial/district/sector); units concentrate on defending their own districts, and are mainly infantry, with a scattering of heavy weapons (heavy machineguns, light mortars and anti-aircraft guns). With the Coalition preferring to bypass population centres, the bulk of the PA may not even be engaged.

A different matter is the Republican Guard Forces Command. The RGFC was originally founded as Saddam's equivalent of the Praetorian Guard, but during the latter half of the Iran-Iraq war it was expanded to battlefield fighting force, acting as shock troops in crucial offensives. The Guard is self-contained and entirely separate from the regular army, and significantly better trained and equipped. This is not in the least place because the Republican Guard is Saddam's first line of defence against any mutinies or coup attempts that might be mounted by elements of regular army. In many ways, the conception and growth of the Republican Guard echoes that of the Nazi German Waffen-SS, and in particular the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler which grew into the 1. SS Panzerdivision.
(In all fairness, it should be noted that the process of a monarch/autarch's bodyguard being expanded into battlefield shock troops is hardly unique; it's the basis for every "Guard" unit in history, such as British Foot Guards and Royal Horse Guards, the Tsarist Russian and Napoleon's Imperial Guard—"La Garde meurt et ne se rend pas!"—the Dutch Garderegimenten—Grenadiers, Jagers and Fuseliers, etc. But rarely does this process occur within the rule of a single person.)

The RGFC comprises two corps, Northern and Southern, each tasked with guarding one side of Baghdad. Northern Corps comprises the al-Madina al-Munawara ("luminous city") ArmdDiv, the Adnan MechDiv and the Baghdad InfDiv, while Southern Corps comprises the al-Nida ArmdDiv, the Hammurabi ArmdDiv and the Nebuchadnezzar (alternate transcription Nabukhuth Nussar) InfDiv. The Guard is equipped with the best hardware Iraq still possesses, such as its remainder of its T-72 tanks and BMP-2 IFVs (probably filled out with BMP-1s). RGFC divisions generally have three brigades, except the al-Madina—and I'm aware that since al is the definite article in Arabic, I'm committing redundancy—division, which has three armoured and one mechanised brigade. Thus, it is not redundant to say that the Coaltion forces are facing three brigades; one brigade is evidently uncommitted.

It should be noted that the Guard's units are not normally allowed into Baghdad (despite the Baghdad Division's name), since there have been plots (sadly foiled) to overthrow Saddam even by senior officers of this supposedly loyal force. The expansion of RGFC led to a decline in its political reliability, and for this reason Saddam found it necessary in 1992 to found the al-Haras al-Jumhuri al-Khas, better known as the Special Republican Guard. If the RGFC is Iraq's Waffen-SS, the SRG is its Taman and Kantemirov Guard units.

The SRG, also known as the "Golden Division," is responsible for the defence of Baghdad itself, the presidential palaces and other vital facilities (which brought it into conflict with UNSCOM inspectors on several occasions) and Saddam's person (not in the least place against any RGFC units that get ideas about ousting the "beloved leader"). It is commanded by Saddam's son Qusay, and is recruited from those tribes most loyal to Saddam. To reinforce this loyalty, its members are well paid, and receive priority in housing and medical services.
The SRG comprises four brigades, an air defence command and a tank command. 1st Brigade—by far the heaviest—is the security element which guards Saddam, his residences and those of other members of the "Inner Circle"; the 2nd, 3rd and 4th are assigned to defend certain sectors of the capital. The air defence element consists of two air defence regiments and three independent batteries, one of which, using pickup trucks, protects motorcades. Tank command consists of two regiments of T-72s.

While the SRG already straddles the line between military and paramilitary, the Fedayeen Saddam ("Saddam's Men of Sacrifice") straddles the line beween paramilitary and secret police. Estimated to number between 30,000 and 40,000 men, the Fedayeen have performed dirty work for the police and regulate smuggling activity. The BBC is currently reporting that the Fedayeen are being used to stiffen the regular army ("Fedayeen force pushes Iraqi army").

I have relied (as has, I suspect, Martin Lumb, the BBC writer) on GlobalSecurity.org's excellent Iraq Military Guide, and I've also drawn a lot of intel from the less comprehensive, but more focused Key Components of Iraqi Ground Forces 2002 page by Robin J. Lee.
I should also credit FAS for the handy hardware links, though much of the AFV stuff also comes from my copy of VS 2-1350 Handboek voor de soldaat (the basic Dutch army field manual), 1991 edition.

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