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31 March 2003: "No Cameras responds to a (self-described) 'Peacenik'"
I ran across a piece titled "A Warmonger Explains War to a Peacenik" (variously attributed to Anonymous, Victor Forsythe or Bill Davidson, if it is attributed at all—truth may be the first casualty of war, but intellectual property is clearly in the top five of casualties of anti-war protest), which is doing the rounds online (you can find it here, and here, or just do a Google search for the title). What a brilliant display of the Straw man fallacy; I don't think I've ever seen one quite so elaborate.
Following on from my own reasons for supporting this war, let the fisking commence!
I'm not actually going to bother copying the so-called "answers" of the WarMonger, since these are merely a parade of straw men. Instead, I'll just take on the "questions" of the "PeaceNik"; I'll have to edit them a bit, of course.
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| PeaceNik: | Why did you say we are we invading Iraq? | | NoCameras: | For a number of reasons, the primary one being that the Iraqi government is in violation of 17 UN Security Council resolutions made acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. | | PN: | But I thought many of our allies, including Israel, were in violation of more security council resolutions than Iraq. | | NC: | A common misconception; the resolutions you're referring to are two (which, you will find, is less that seventeen) Chapter VI resolutions, in which the Council makes recommendations dealing with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." (I recommend you read this article.) Resolution 687, on the other hand, is a Chapter VII resolution, which is binding, though Iraq actually agreed to comply with it; by agreeing to comply with 687, Iraq agreed, among other things, to divest itself of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, delivery systems for those weapons, and all programmes to develop those weapons and delivery systems. | | PN: | [...] But I thought the weapons inspectors said Iraq had no nuclear weapons. | | NC: | The IAEA destroyed most of the Iraqi nuclear programme in the 1990s, and they now believe the Iraqis didn't manage to rebuild it, if that's what you mean. Mind you, not that anyone would have known if Iraq hadn't let the inspectors back in because the Bush administration threatened invasion. Then there are still the chemical and biological weapons programmes, which form a threat to other countries in the region. | | PN: | But I thought Iraq did not have any long range missiles for attacking us or our allies with such weapons. | | NC: | They've certainly been trying to develop them, as a quick glance at any number of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC reports will show (if you'd actually bothered to read them). And if you accept that Israel and Kuwait are American allies, a long-range missile isn't even needed to hit an American ally; a short or intermediate-range one will do.
There is also the fear that Iraq might supply biological or chemical warfare agents to terrorists. | | PN: | But couldn't virtually any country sell chemical or biological materials? We sold quite a bit to Iraq in the eighties ourselves, didn't we? | | NC: | Well, materials and warfare agents aren't the same thing; I could sell you a load of charcoal, sulphur and potassium nitrate, but whether you'd have the wherewithal to turn it into gunpowder is a different matter. As for the supposed US sales, so I've read, but as far as the chemicals are concerned, I've never seen any actual proof to back that assertion. However, the CDC, among others, did sell some germ culture samples to Iraq in the 1980s. | | PN: | We sold [...] biological materials to a power-hungry lunatic murderer? | | NC: | Those culture samples were actually sold to the Universities of Baghdad and Basra, on the understanding that they were for medical research; as it turned out, they went straight into the Iraqi bioweapons programme, but as Jonathan Tucker, an UNSCOM bioweapons inspector, put it: "I don't think it would be accurate to say the United States government deliberately provided seed stocks to the Iraqis' biological weapons programs."
And again, materials and agents are not the same thing.
And though I wouldn't call Saddam a lunatic, he's certainly a power-hungry murderer; witness his attempt to annexe Kuwait in 1990. | | PN: | [...] But didn't our ambassador to Iraq, April Gillespie, know about and green-light the invasion of Kuwait? | | NC: | What Glaspie, as you'll discover her name actually was, actually told Saddam this:I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.
[...]
Frankly, we can see only that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. What this "concern" entailed is borne out by the fact that on 24-Jan-1990, the FY 1992-1997 Defense Planning Guidance was published; this instructed Central Command (CENTCOM), then headed by General Norman Schwartzkopf, to shift the focus of its planning away from the threat of a Soviet incursion into the Gulf region (and Iran in particular) and towards the threat of an invasion of the Arabian peninsula (and especially the capture of the oil fields) by another country in the region (source: Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, both of 07-Feb-1990). These instructions were confirmed by General Schwartzkopf in his testimony to the Senate Armed Forces Committee on 08-Feb-1990; he also drew attention to the fact that Iraq had recently purchased from the Soviet Union a large number of armoured fighting vehicles, artillery pieces, etc. which had become surplus to Soviet requirements following the withdrawal from Eastern Europe.
So not only was the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq not approved by the United States government, planning was already in the works to meet such an eventuality.
Now, because it's your script, I have to bring up Osama bin Laden. So, "Osama bin Laden" already. | | PN: | Osama Bin Laden? Wasn't the point of invading Afghanistan to kill him? | | NC: | Among other things; the other objective was to destroy al-Qaeda's base of training and operations. The second objective was more or less achieved, though it seems Osama may have escaped. It's sort of hard to tell, since there haven't been any more video tapes. Maybe he's alive, but in such an awful state he doesn't want to be seen. All we have to go is these audio tapes, which may or may not actually be by Osama bin Laden. Like the one broadcast by al-Jazeera on 11-Feb-2003, in which someone claiming to be Osama calls upon "Muslims in general and the Iraqis in particular" to resist the American invasion. | | PN: | Is this the same audio tape where Osama Bin Laden labels Saddam a secular infidel? | | NC: | He obliquely refers to the Ba'ath Party as "socialists" and adds "socialists are infidels wherever they are"; since Saddam is the leader of the Ba'ath Party, we may assume this applies to him as well. But at no point does the purported Osama actually apply the term "secular infidel" to Saddam, so I have to conclude you haven't read the transcript. If you had, you'd know the purported Osama also says that "there will be no harm if the interests of Muslims converge with the interests of the socialists in the fight against the crusaders, despite our belief in the infidelity of socialists." | | PN: | He did? | | NC: | Yes, read the transcript. I'm a bit surprised you hadn't already, to be honest.
Oh, sorry, I didn't stick to your script! Let's take it from the top of the page.
"Powell presented a strong case against Iraq." | | PN: | He did? | | NC: | Yes. Again, read the transcript. Yeah, sorry if I'm falling into repetition here, but you don't appear to have read up on this. Powell presented a pretty powerful case that Iraq was not cooperating "immediately, unconditionally and actively" with UNMOVIC and IAEA inspections, as required by resolution 1441.
You're going to have to wing the next bit of the script, because I'm not as cooperative as your fictional WarMonger. | | PN: | But didn't that "Al Quaeda poison factory" Powell mentioned turn out to be a harmless shack in the part of Iraq controlled by the Kurdish opposition? | | NC: | To be precise, Powell referred to it as a "poison and explosives training centre"; he never used the word "factory." I admit I have my doubts as to the credibility of this al-Qaeda/Ansar al-Islam/Saddam link, but it's not because of your misrepresentations.
Next. | | PN: | And wasn't there some British intelligence report that turned out to be copied from an out-of-date graduate student paper? | | NC: | A small part of the report was indeed copied, more or less, from a paper on the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War written by Ibrahim al-Marashi. The paper itself, however, is hardly "out of date"—it was published in the Middle East Review of International Affairs last September. Moreover, as this BBC article describes, the copied sections relate to the functions of organs of the Iraqi government, and those haven't changed much over the past 12 years. Ibrahim al-Marashi said himself, on BBC Two's Newsnight programme, that apart from "a few minor cosmetic changes" the material was still accurate. | | PN: | Well, okay, but weren't the reports of Iraqis hiding evidence contradicted by the chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix? | | NC: | Ah, you refer to Blix' report to the Security Council on 14-Feb-2003. Blix didn't actually contradict Powell, he qualified one of Powell's allegations:I would like to comment only on one case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of an imminent inspection. Our reservation on this point does not detract from our appreciation for the briefing. Emphases in bold mine. As you see, Blix does not say it wasn't "movement of proscribed munitions," he says it might "just as easily" have been routine activity. Logically, of course, it follows that the reverse is equally true, and that it might just as easily have, in actual fact, been "movement of proscribed munitions."
I don't know either way, but Blix' last line in that quote pretty much sums up the almost total inaccuracy of your assertion that Blix contradicted Powell. | | PN: | Oh, wait, I forgot to point out those "mobile weapons labs" were only artistic renderings! | | NC: | I'm glad you mentioned those; here's what Blix had to say about those in that same report:It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by trucks. In the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of inspections. The rest of that particular report is pretty damning as well; large amounts of chemical (VX) and biological (anthrax) warfare agents unaccounted for, the discovery of undeclared empty chemical munitions, missile casting chambers which had been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision "reconstituted," 380 SA-2 missile engines imported in contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687... | | PN: | Erm, yeah, never mind about that. There is no publicly available evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, though, is there? | | NC: | Well, Blix reported on 14-Feb-2003 that a start had been made on the destruction of 50 litres of mustard; in his quarterly report, published two weeks later, that destruction was still in progress, so when the original version of this "dialogue" was written there most certainly was evidence. | | PN: | Uh, yeah, but... that stuff was being destroyed; there's no evidence that there are any other WMDs. | | NC: | Ah, now there you have a valid point. But finding those weapons is not the inspectors' primary job. | | PN: | [rallying] Okay, what is the inspectors' job? | | NC: | To verify whether Iraq has divested itself of NBC weapons, delivery systems and development programmes, thereby complying with resolutions 687, 1441 and all intervening relevant resolutions. Thus, the burden of proof is not on the inspectors to prove that Iraq has not disarmed, it is on Iraq to prove to the inspectors that it has. And since it has, thus far, failed to this, it remains in "material breach" of its obligations under the aforementioned resolutions. | | PN: | Erm... but what about North Korea? North Korea actually has large amounts of usable chemical, biological, AND nuclear weapons, AND long range missiles that can reach the west coast AND it has expelled nuclear weapons inspectors, AND threatened to turn America into a sea of fire. | | NC: | So you're advocating war against North Korea; are you sure you're a "peacenik"? | | PN: | No. I mean, yes. Erm, maybe. | | NC: | Besides, North Korea is not a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, so—unlike Iraq, which agreed to abide by resolutions 687 etc.—there's nothing to stop it having chemical weapons; there's nothing to stop it developing missiles either. Besides, the Taepodong 2, the one that can supposedly reach my house, is untested.
Say, the main source for the claim that North Korea actually has nukes and that the Taepodong 2 works is the Chairman of the CIA—when did you start believing spooks? No, don't answer that.
The basic difference between Iraq and North Korea is that in the case of North Korea, diplomacy has not been exhausted. At least, not yet. | | PN: | But it has in the case of Iraq? | | NC: | The Iraqi government agreed to resolution 687 in the first place because the 1991 Coalition was clearly going to stomp it if it didn't. In the twelve years since then, just about the only thing that has got Iraq to even pretend to fulfil its obligations is the imminent threat of armed force. You do realise that UNMOVIC had been around for more than three and half years before it was even let into Iraq? If it wasn't for the threat of invasion, UNMOVIC might have gone its entire existence without ever setting foot in the country it was supposed to be inspecting.
You tell me what possible diplomatic solution there might be. | | PN: | You clearly can't see the big picture! [stomps off in a self-righteous huff] | | NC: | Sigh. |
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