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[Previous entry: "The Secretary's chariot is definitely on fire"] [Main Index] [Next entry: "In which objectivity goes out the window"] 18 July 2003: "Operation Northern Exit"There's an risk inherent to blogging while also frequenting online discussion fora, which is that one's train of thought on a particular topic tends to switch between two sets of tracks, only one of which is visible in either arena. In plain language, I've had ideas come to me while discussing Iraq over on 3WA which I've neglected to express on No Cameras. But luckily, I ran into something which jogged my memory. The something in question was this entry by Oliver Kamm, and in particular this passage: The anti-war campaigners were fond of claiming there was no connection between September 11 and Saddam; but September 11 demonstrated that containment of Saddam, quite apart from being a cruel policy, was also a strategically futile one.Oliver's further illustration of links between al-Qaeda and the Ba'athi régime is, to put it charitably, tenuous in the extreme, but it reminded me of a thought which had occurred to me regarding the link between the influence of both factors on US foreign policy. I've mentioned before that Saddam formed a strategic threat in the Persian Gulf. As I wrote, Saddam Hussein formed a strategic threat in that he had demonstrated a desire to establish control of a sizeable portion of the oilfields of the Persian Gulf, evinced by the invasion of Iran in 1980 and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and supported by threatening noises made at the United Arab Emirates shortly prior to the invasion of Kuwait.Considering the Iraqi navy was damn near existent even by 1990, the obvious way for Iraqi forces to move on the UAE would be by land, via the coastal route through Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province (i.e. Khafji-Dammam-Hufuf-Salwa), which happens to be where all the Saudi oilfields are. And while you're going that route, why not grab Bahrein and Qatar while you're at it? As long as Saddam was in power in Iraq, "containment" was going to require the presence of American troops in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. And, as astute readers will remember, the presence of "infidels" in the Kingdom, apart from being a major source of friction with Saudi government, was ostensibly al-Qaeda's main beef with the US, and one that many devout muslims—especially in the Arabian peninsula—could relate to (which was exactly why al-Qaeda presented it as its main beef). So there you have the dilemma: in order to limit sympathy (and support) for al-Qaeda, the US needed to remove its troops from Saudi Arabia. But it also had to do so without leaving Saudi Arabia vulnerable to Iraq, and without giving the impression that it was giving in to al-Qaeda pressure. The obvious answer was to force régime change in Iraq, which would remove the threat to Saudi which had necessitated the presence of US forces in the first place, while also enabling the US government to state that it was leaving not because it was forced to leave, but because it no longer needed to be there. (By way of backing up my argument, I refer the reader to the BBC article "US pulls out of Saudi Arabia" from 29-Apr-2003, and in particular the first half and the closing paragraphs.) So in conclusion, I would say there was a direct link between al-Qaeda and Baghdad, though not in the way the administration chose to portray it. Update: Marbel in the Netherlands sent me a link to the article "Securing the Gulf" by Kenneth Pollack, published in the current issue of Foreign Affairs (thanks, Marbel). I'd like to think my ideas in this entry are supported by this paragraph: The best way for the United States to address the rise of terrorism and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states would be to reduce its military presence in the region to the absolute minimum, or even to withdraw entirely. The presence of American troops fuels the terrorists' propaganda claims that the United States seeks to prop up the hated local tyrants and control the Middle East. And it is a source of humiliation and resentment for pretty much all locals -- a constant reminder that the descendants of the great Islamic empires can no longer defend themselves and must answer to infidel powers. So pulling back would diminish the internal pressure on the Persian Gulf regimes and give them the political space they need to enact the painful reforms that are vital to their long-term stability. But such a withdrawal, in turn, would be the worst move from the perspective of deterring and containing Iran -- or of being in a good position to respond swiftly to, say, a civil war in Saudi Arabia should one ever emerge.Mind you, there's lot more in the article which is food for thought, so do take a look if you are so inclined. |
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